Conventional phase-truncation-based double-image encryption (PT-DIE) scheme suffers from the phase retrieval algorithm-based attack, and information disclosure issue. In this paper, we introduce cylindrical diffraction and position multiplexing into the PT-DIE scheme. Through position multiplexing, double-image are integrated together. Then the integrated image is encoded into a real-valued cyphertext and two phase-only keys (POKs) by cylindrical diffraction. The decrypted images are acquired with two POKs by inverse cylindrical diffraction, and because of that, the phase retrieval algorithm-based attack and the information disclosure issue have been thoroughly conquered from a theoretical and experimental point of view. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can be extended to encode multi-image without changing original system architecture, and incurring additional computing burden. Simulation results have been manifested the validity and the security of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical information security has attracted wide research interests in the field of information security due to the superior capabilities of high-speed, parallelism, and high encryption dimension [1] , [7] . Especially, the double random phaseencoding technique (DRPE) based on 4-f system, which was firstly designed by Refregier and Javidi in 1995 [8] , are extensively studied in recent years. However, some research results have disclosed that the DRPE algorithm and its extended approaches [9] - [12] are prone to various attacks including the known-plaintext attack [13] , the chosen-plaintext attack [14] , and the chosen-cyphertext attack [15] because of its linear characteristics.
To withstand these attacks stemmed from linearity issue, nonlinear encryption algorithm based on the operation of phase-truncation was presented by Qin and Peng [16] .
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But, this method was fragile to the specific attack based on the iterative Fourier transforms [17] . Therefore, some improvement cryptosystem [18] - [22] have been proposed to resist specific attack. In these approaches, a novel doubleimage nonlinear encryption algorithm has been proposed by Wang and Zhao [18] . It was reported that doubleimage were one step encoded into a noisy image by the operation of phase-truncation of a joint Fourier transform. Subsequently, the authors introduce, for the first time, the concept of ''information disclosure'' in phase-truncation based cryptosystems [23] . That is, if the main information of the input plaintext can be obtained by using one part of keys or cyphertexts, the risk of information disclosure emerges. However, for phase-truncation-based double-image encryption (PT-DIE) scheme [18] , when using the two phase keys, obtained in encryption procedure, with the absence of the cyphertext to reconstruct the plaintext, the problem of information disclosure really exists. Although its enhancements were proposed in [23] , and [24] , method in [23] VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ encrypted two images separately rather than as a whole, while algorithm in [24] focused on color image encryption not for double-image. Furthermore, though the PT-DIE scheme has been declared that it is not affected by some common attacks, a hybrid attack strategy [25] is implemented to recover the encrypted double-image by using the phase retrieval algorithm and the joint power spectrum. Moreover, since this strategy needs the original position parameters and the computation-intensive retrieval approach, we further proposed a simple public-key attack scheme [26] . In this method, two decryption keys are simply produced by the three public keys and arbitrary position parameters, followed by the approximate values of the original double-image. Subsequently, a generalized phase retrieval algorithm [27] , and its enhancement version [28] with median filtering and normalization operation are further proposed to break this double-image cryptosystem. Therefore, a nonlinear double-image encryption algorithm that can have high resistance against the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks [25] - [28] and is free of information disclosure simultaneously, has yet to be developed.
To address these two issues, a nonlinear double-image strategy based on cylindrical diffraction and position multiplexing is proposed. In the process of cylindrical diffraction, the input is represented as a cylinder object, while the intermediate surface is concentric cylinder. Consequently, the position-multiplexed double-image can be encoded through an asymmetric cylindrical diffraction with three random phase masks positioned on the input and intermediate surfaces. Meanwhile, the operation of phase-truncation is employed on the intermediate and output surfaces, accompanied with two asymmetric phase-only masks for decryption and a real-valued amplitude cyphertext. In addition, the radius and the height of the cylinder plus the distance of the cylindrical diffraction can be employed as additional keys into the cryptosystem to further enhance the security of the system. The integration of phase-truncation maintains the properties of nonlinear structure, and it results in real-valued output. The deploying of cylindrical-diffraction helps to resist the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks. Moreover, because of the asymmetric structure of cylindrical diffraction and inverse cylindrical diffraction, the issue of information disclosure is conquered. Numerical simulations are presented to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed cryptosystem. In [31] , a cascade and independent encrypted cylindrical-diffraction scheme is proposed. However, in this paper, we extends that work in three ways. First, position multiplexing technique is adopted to fuse the double-image even multi-image as a whole, not in separate operation with the cascade mode. Second, this paper not only describes the cylinder diffraction can resist the phase retrieval attack and information disclosure from the experimental point of view, but also analyzes its feasibility from the theoretical point of view. Third, the proposed scheme does not need modify the system architecture to further encrypt multi-image as a whole. As a consequence, the multi-image can be encoded without extra time increasing, and decoded results do not appear the loss of quality.
The contributions of this paper are composed of four parts. First, this is the first time in presenting a PT-DIE scheme that combines a position multiplexing technique together with a cylindrical-diffraction architecture. So, it holds the nonlinear property and asymmetric structure.
Second, the position multiplexing operation does not alter the cylindrical-diffraction setup of any kind. Thus, the encryption time of the proposed scheme has barely increased with the increment of images, and the quality of decrypted images is maintained.
Third, the procedure of encryption can be performed in one-step, avoiding objects locating procedure in cascaded cryptosystem. In this sense, the double-image even multiimage can be encoded simultaneously.
Four, the phase retrieval algorithm-based attack and the information disclosure issue have been conquered from a theoretical and experimental point of view.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS A. THE PT-DIE AND ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS
In PT-DIE, two plaintexts f 1 (x, y), and f 2 (x, y) that located in two different space position (a 1 , b 1 ), and (a 2 , b 2 ) are modulated with two random phase masks RPM 1 , and RPM 2 , respectively. Thus the input image can be denoted as
After the execution of joint Fourier transform and the phase truncation, the amplitude part and one phase-only key can be calculated as
where the operators Tr{·}, Re{·} and FT {·} represent phase truncation, phase reservation, and Fourier transform, respectively.
In the same way, the final encrypted result E(x) and another phase-only key can be obtained as
where IFT {·} and RPM 3 (u, v) are inverse Fourier transform and another random phase mask. As reported in [18] , using P 0 (u, v) and P 1 (x, y) as decryption keys and combining with the cyphertext, the plaintexts can be correctly retrieved. It is well known that there is an information disclosure issue existing in this cryptosystem [23] . In other words, some information about plaintext can be observed when using both P 0 (u, v) and P 1 (x, y) without the cyphertext in the verification scheme. Meanwhile, it has been reported that this scheme can be cracked by the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks [25]- [28] . In order to specify these problems, we choose two plaintexts ''Lion'', and ''Saturn'' ( Fig. 1(a) , 256 × 256 pixels) as the input plaintexts. When only decryption keys (i.e. P 0 (u, v) and P 1 (x, y) are adopted for decryption, the information leaked results are shown in Fig. 1(b) . And the cracked results by attack method [25] - [28] are depicted in Fig. 1 (c)-1(f), respectively. Obviously, some information of the input plaintexts can be observed, which clearly illustrate its issue of information disclosure, and security.
B. CYLINDRICAL DIFFRACTION AND THE PROPOSAL
In 2005, and 2017, Sando et al. [29] and Wang et al. [30] , [32] have implemented the fast calculation of cylindrical diffraction with fast Fourier transform, respectively, which provides significant assistance for extending to image encryption domain. Since the cylindrical diffraction have two propagation models, i.e. from outside to inside (OIP) and from inside to outside (IOP), shown in Fig. 2 , suppose the OIP model is employed in encryption procedure, the IOP model must be adopted for decryption, vise verse. This novel propagation ways make the cylindrical diffraction possessing the characteristic of asymmetric. Thus cryptosystem build on it have higher security than the conventional DRPE has, which is based on propagation between several parallel planes.
In this paper, taking advantage of position multiplexing, we integrated the cylindrical diffraction technique into the PT-DIE scheme to achieve double-image cryptosystem. Suppose that there are two images to be processed, and they are defined as
Apparently, in order to combine these two images as a whole, we should appropriate choose space position to keep the reconstructed two images non-overlapping. Fortunately, through position multiplexing technique [33] , they are respectively located in the positions (a i , b i ), i = 1, 2 of the same plane along the axes x and y, which can be written as
Here, we adopt OIP model of cylindrical diffraction for encryption, the same goes for IOP model. So, the combined image f pm (x, y) is positioned at the outside cylindrical surface with the radii of R o as input of cylindrical diffraction. After propagation a distance of d 1 in OIP model with the wavelength λ of the illuminating light, the wave front arrives at the intermediate surface and executes the nonlinear operation of phase-truncation, the encoded image can be expressed as follow: 
is the representation of cylindrical coordinate for f pm (x, y), and also is the distribution of outside cylindrical surface.
CyD OIP is the OIP propagation of cylindrical diffraction, and can be mathematically calculated as
where s, C, k, I , and λ denote the object surface, a constant, the wavenumber of the incident light, the imaginary unit, and the wavelength of the illuminating light, respectively; And Fig. 2(a) , on the object and intermediate surfaces or outside and inside cylindrical surface, respectively. Since twice direct cylindrical diffraction will lead to sampling problem of too big difference of sampling pitches, and it is impracticable [30] , [32] , only once cylindrical diffraction is adopted here to solve this issue. Whereafter, g 0 (θ R i , z R i ) combines with another random phase key, R 3 (θ R i , z R i ), and the combined result Fourier-transforms followed by phasetruncation. Thus, the final cyphertext E(u, v) can be achieved as:
It can be inferred that E(u, v) is a real-valued function and thus can be more convenient to record and transmit. In the meantime, two decryption keys, i.e. private keys, P 0 (θ R i , z R i ) and P 1 (u, v) are produced accompanied with encryption process.
For decryption, we first recover g 0 (θ R i , z R i ) with the decryption keys P 1 (u, v), the process of which is similar to the decryption of PT-DIE scheme, and can be obtained by:
is obtained after a IOP model propagation of inverse cylindrical diffraction with the wavelength λ of the illuminating light, can be expressed as: 11) where CyD IOP represents the inverse process of CyD OIP and can be calculated as the Rayleigh-Sommerfeld integral formulas.
as shown in Fig. 2(b 
It is seen that due to position multiplexing, the information from different input plaintexts are independent from each other. Then f pm (x, y) is considered as the object image of the cylindrical diffraction, followed by the phase-truncation operator. The details of this process is described as follows.
In the last, the spectrum of inverse cylindrical diffraction is operated with the phase-truncation, and the output can be obtained as:
Clearly, two original images (f 1 (x, y), and f 2 (x, y)) can be easily extracted from the output. In order to illustrate the encryption and the decryption procedure, the flowcharts for them are shown in Fig. 3 (a) and 3(b), respectively.
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
From the aforementioned description of cryptosystem, although the position multiplexing technique, and cylindrical diffraction are deployed in the encryption procedures, they only change the composing form of input image from individual treatment to integrated operation, and the mode of propagation from parallel planes to cylindrical surface. Obviously, no linear component is brought in. Thus, the nonlinear characteristic is still kept in our proposed scheme. Meanwhile, since the decryption keys (P 0 (θ R i , z R i ) and P 1 (u, v)) is related to the input double-image or multiimage, the proposed method is free of known-plaintext attack, and chosen-plaintext attack in theoretically. In addition, since the inverse propagation of OIP model is IOP model in optical setup, and the diffraction calculation of propagation of OIP model is also different from that of the reversed direction, i.e. IOP model, the cylindrical diffraction is asymmetric, and thus is free of the phase-retrieval attack, and information disclosure. Hence the proposed algorithm can also resist the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks, covering Deng's attack [25] , a generalized phase retrieval algorithm (GPRA) attack [27] , a special attack [28] , and the simple public-key attack [26] , even information leakage analyzed as follows. If only the constraints or preconditions are broken, the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks [25] , [27] , [28] , and the simple public-key attack [26] can be avoided. For Deng's attack, using the cyphertext E(u, v), R 3 and the encryption key g 0 (θ R i , z R i ), the plaintexts can be approximately estimated by operating iterative transform. But, on account of asymmetric cylindrical diffraction, the positive image and the phase mask blend together, making the preconditions (FT [f 2 
CyD OIP [f 1 (x, y)] * CyD OIP (R 1 ) = CyD OIP (R 1 ). Thus, original double-image will not be obtained correctly. For the simple public-key attack, it need two error-functions to approximate 1. Similar to the invalid reasons of Deng's attack, the two error-functions cannot converge to 1, causing the attacked results incorrectly.
For the GPRA attack or the special attack, the main process is modified as our proposed method and calculated as:
(1) Arbitrarily set two matrices f i (x, y), i = 1, 2 and position parameters (a i , b i ), i = 1, 2 as the estimations of the original plaintexts and position parameters. Then, their integration is given by
(2) A cylindrical diffraction and the phase truncation are performed, the results are given by
(3) E k is substituted with the cyphertext E. Then an inverse cylindrical diffraction and phase truncation are executed, the estimated plaintexts f i (x, y), i = 1, 2 are obtained by
(4) Repeated steps 1-3 until the iteration number reaches a preset threshold value.
From these iterative phase retrieval procedures, we can see that the constraints are the public keys (R i , i = 1, 2, 3), the cyphertext E(u, v), and the parameters (R i , R o , H , λ) of cylindrical diffraction. Because the OIP model and IOP model is not symmetric, and the deduction process of them is also different plus their parameters (R i , R o , H , λ) also unpublicized, the constraints (i.e. E(u, v), and (R i , R o , H , λ)) will be broken and original images will not be cracked correctly with iterative transforms.
For the issue of information disclosure of the conventional PT-DIE scheme as described in section Section II-A, when both decryption keys are directly used to decode, the primary information of the input plaintexts can be clearly observed, as shown in Fig. 1(b) . In order to theoretical discuss whether our proposed scheme can resist the information disclosure, we firstly modify the phase key P 0 (u, v) since R * 3 (θ R i , z R i ) is essential for decryption, and expressed as
. Then the phase modulation executes with P 0 (θ R i , z R i ) and P 1 (u, v) for decryption, and the result of information disclosure, ID(x, y), can be calculated as
ID(x, y)
But, unfortunately, what we have assumed here were not true,
Thus, ID(x, y) cannot be deduced to the input plaintext. That means the proposed scheme can resist the information disclosure. The conclusion can be drawn that because of using position multiplexing and phase-truncation in cylindrical diffraction domain, our proposed algorithm holds the nonlinear characteristic, and have higher security than the conventional PT-DIE cryptosystem has.
D. OPTICAL REALIZATION
The proposed cryptosystem is also suggested for optical verification due to its simple optical implementation. A possible implementation displays in Fig. 4 . f t (θ R o , z R o ), and R 3 represent double-image modulated by two random phase keys (R 1 , and R 2 ), and random phase key, respectively. The input object f t (θ R o , z R o ) locates at the source surface with radii of R o and propagates to the intermediate surface with radius of R i , on which the distribution is u R i (θ R i , z R i ). Through the operations of phase-truncation and phase-reservation, the encrypted image is captured by CCD. Since the decryption is the inverse process of encryption, a possible implementation of decryption is in the reversed order of encryption procedures. Due to the current resource limitation in our laboratory, some numerical simulations are made to test the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION A. ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION RESULTS
Numerical experiments are conducted to verify our proposed cryptosystem with Matlab 2017(a) on a 64-bit computer. The parameters (R i , R o , H , λ) of cylindrical diffraction are set as 10mm, 100 mm, 64 mm, and 96 um, respectively, and can be also employed as the keys of cylindrical diffraction. Two original images, ''Lena'' (256 × 256 pixel) and ''Barbara'' (256 × 256 pixel), which are shown in Fig. 5 (a) and 5(b), can be used as the object images for double-image encryption. For guaranteeing the retrieved two images without being superimposed, the two images are located in the centered and zero-padded images (700 × 700 pixels) as the input plaintexts, and the two position parameters (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) are set as (−175, 0), and (175, 0), respectively. Figure 5 (c) and 5(d) represent the encryption result, and the correct decrypted image. From them, it can be seen that the encryption image shows good noise-like property, and the decrypted images shows good retrieved quality. The two decryption keys produced in the encryption procedures, (h) the correct key P 1 while P 0 is wrong. and adopted for the correct decryption are displayed in Fig. 5(e) , and 5(f).
To evaluate the reliability of this method, the Correlation Coefficient (CC) value between the plaintext, f , and the decrypted image, f , is adopted and can be calculated by the following equation:
where cov and σ denote cross-covariance, and standard deviation, respectively. Here, the coordinates (x,y) are omitted for the sake of brevity. The CC values between the input plaintext, and the Fig. 5(d) is one, which means the decryption process is the lossless inverse of the encryption process.
B. CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND THE PHASE RETRIEVAL ALGORITHM-BASED ATTACK
In this section, same attacks are executed with different keys. The result of brute force attack using no decryption keys is shown in Fig. 6(a) . Figure 6 (b) displays the result of arbitrarily chosen decryption keys. The attack result with the public keys is represented in Fig. 6 (c). Figures 6(d)-6(e), with the names of ''Peppers'' and ''Cameraman'', are the two fake plain images that employed to produce decryption keys. As can be seen from Fig. 6(f) , the recovered image offers no valuable information when the fake keys are used for decryption. Attacks with a part of public keys are also shown in Fig. 6 (g) and 6(h). Figure 6(g) is the decryption result using the correct key P 0 while P 1 is wrong. The attack result, which realized using the correct key P 1 while P 0 is wrong, is demonstrated in Fig. 6(h) . In addition, the CC values corresponding to Fig. 6 (a)-6(c) and 6(f)-6(h) are 0.0096, 0.0112, 0.0204, 0.0153, 0.0219 and 0.0038, respectively. These results verify that any attempt at the decryption of cyphertext without correctly decryption keys will fail. Figure 7 displays the attack results using the phase retrieval algorithm-based attacks, including Deng's attack [25] , GPRA attack [27] , and the special attack [28] , and the simple public-key attack [26] . The original double-image are the combination of ''Lion'', and ''Saturn'', shown in Fig. 1(a) . The results of (a) Deng's attack [25] ; (b) simple public-key attack [26] ; GPRA [27] attack (c) without diffraction parameters; (d) with correct diffraction parameters; Special attack [28] (e) without diffraction parameters; (f) with correct diffraction parameters. Deng's attack, and the simple public-key attack do not need any knowledge of cryptosystem to be crack except for three public keys. Thus, theirs attacked results are shown in Fig. 7(a) and 7(b) , respectively. Supposing the intruder has no knowledge of proposed cryptosystem, the decrypted results of GPRA, and the special attack are displayed in Fig. 7 (c) and 7(e). Therewith the adversary may improve the attack of GPRA, and the special attack with the correct cylindrical diffraction process. The simulation results under this condition are represented in Fig. 7(d) and 7(f). These results illustrate that the phase retrieval-based attack algorithm is inefficient for the proposed improvement cryptosystem. The CC values between decrypted plaintexts shown in Fig. 7 show the corresponding relation between iteration number and the CC values under the cylindrical diffraction condition. They demonstrate that the plaintext's information cannot be recovered.
In conclusion the designed cryptosystem has the ability of invalidating the phase retrieval-based attack no matter if the attacker has the prior knowledge of cylindrical diffraction.
C. THE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
As reported in reference [18] , the information disclosure is defined as when lacking any one of the cyphertext or decryption keys in the decryption procedure, some information about the input plaintext can be clearly observed. While fullfailed decryption means no information of the input plaintexts is recovered from the decrypted results. This means it is free of information disclosure. Here we carried out an experiment to test whether the proposed scheme can resist the issue of information disclosure as the same as the theoretical analysis. In our proposed algorithm, the decryption keys (P 0 , and P 1 ) for double-image are hidden in the cylindrical diffraction with the cyphertext of E. When only P 0 , P 0 plus E, P 0 plus P 1 for double-image (''Lena'' and ''Barbara''), the recovered results are displayed in Fig. 9 (a), 9(b) , and 9(c), respectively. It can be observed that information of the original double-image is not divulged at all, which is consistent with theoretical analysis. Therefore, the risk of information disclosure has completely been eliminated from our proposed scheme.
D. KEY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Generally, the sensitivity of the encryption parameters should be considered to address whether the cryptosystem is stable. Compared with the conventional PT-IDE cryptosystem, our proposed method mainly introduces four parameters, i.e. (R i , R o , H , λ) of cylindrical diffraction. Thus, it will be necessary to study the sensitivity of the decrypted results to the four parameters. Figure 10(a) shows the decrypted results with the outer cylinder Ro under a slight deviation R o while other keys remain unchanged. Obviously, the decrypted results cannot be correctly recovered. In the same ways, varying the parameters of (R i , H , λ), the results are shown in Fig. 10(b)-10(d) . Meanwhile, the CC values between the plaintext, and the Fig. 10 (a)-10(d) are 0.0202, 0.0122, 0.0125, and 0.0022, respectively. Furthermore, the corresponding CC values between the original and the decrypted results, as the function of the R o , R i , H and λ, are shown in Fig. 10(e) . The above results fully illustrate that when using an arbitrarily chosen parameters to recover the plaintext, it will fail.
E. OTHER ATTACKS
In this section, we first consider the statistical analysis of the plaintext images and the cyphertext image. Figs. 11(a)-11(c) show the histograms of two plaintext images, the input double-image, and the corresponding histogram of cyphertext image, respectively. Subsequently, we further adopt another 50 images from the USC Signal and Image Processing Institute database (SIPI dataset) [34] for encryption, and display the corresponding histogram of their cyphertext in Fig. 11(e) . It is observed that the histogram of cyphertext image has similar distribution, and is evidently different from that of plaintext images. Then, six thousand pixel pairs from the selected 50 plaintext images from the SIPI database [34] (in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions) are randomly chosen to test the correlation of two adjacent pixels. Figs. 12 (a) -(c) and 12 (d)-(f) display correlations of adjacent pixels before and after encryption in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions, respectively. Obviously, the correlations of adjacent pixels of the cyphertext are remarkable reduced compared with those of original plaintexts in all the three directions. The above results and analysis demonstrate that no valuable information can be obtained from the statistical analysis of the histograms and correlations.
Next, the robustness of the cryptosystem against noise and occlusion attacks on the encrypted results also should be checked. The occluded encrypted images with 64 × 64 pixels, and its corresponding recovered image are displayed in Fig. 13(a) and 13(b) . For noise attack, the Gaussiannoised encrypted image with variance value 0.1 is depicted in Fig. 13(c) and the corresponding recovered image is shown in Fig. 13(d) . The CC values corresponding to Fig. 13(b) and Fig. 13(d) are 0.9709, and 0.9479, respectively. It can be gained that the decrypted images exhibit most information of the input image. Next, the CC values of the occlusion attack and Gaussian-noise attack in the range [0.1, 0.9] and [0, 0.5] are shown in Fig. 13 (e) and 13(f), respectively. From these figures, they indicate that the CC value decreases with an increase in occlusion size or Gaussian noise. The above experimental results manifest that our proposed algorithm can resist the occlusion and Gaussian-noise attack.
F. SYSTEM EXPANDABILITY
The proposed scheme can extend to encode more images by appropriate choosing space position with position multiplexing technique. In essence, the proposed scheme can encode infinite images, but the resolution of integrated images may increase by an integer factor. Hence, 2, 4, 8, 12, 13, and 14 different images with 256 × 256 pixels, shown in Fig. 14, are executed with the proposed scheme and the method [31] , respectively. Here, the time spent in the process of multiimage with different numbers, and the corresponding average CC values are counted.
The results are demonstrated in Table 1 and Fig. 15 . Clearly, the encryption time of the proposed scheme slightly increase with the increment of images, but the comparative method [31] remarkably augments. Meanwhile, the quality of method [31] begin to degrade significantly when the number of encrypted images reaches 12. However, most information of the decrypted images are also retained, and theirs visual quality almost no change.
IV. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have developed an scheme for double-image cryptosystem. By aid of position multiplexing, two primary images are compacted into a single gray image, which are further encoded into a real-valued amplitude cyphertext by cylindrical diffraction, accompanied by two phase decryption keys. For decryption, the double-plaintext can be obtained through inverse cylindrical diffraction if all parameters are correct. Compared with the conventional PT-IDE methods, our proposed scheme can overcome the information disclosure issue, and increases the system security. Meanwhile, it is also demonstrated to be robust to the various attacks, especially the phase-retrieval-based attacks, for the introduction of cylindrical diffraction strategy, which possesses the nonlinear characteristic and asymmetric structure. Furthermore, the extended multi-image cryptosystem of our proposed scheme maintain the original cylindrical-diffraction structure except for the object surface composition. As a result, the encryption procedure of multi-image does not add extra computing time, and the quality of decryption is also guaranteed. Simulations results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is feasible and effective for double-image or multiimage encryption. In the future, we will apply this scheme to some applications, such as authentication, QR code, anticounterfeiting and other fields.
